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Korea provides a unique opportunity to study the different behaviors or roles, if any, of limited
flexibility and free floating exchange rate regimes. Korea shifted from a limited flexibility to a
free floating exchange rate regime after the 1997 economic crisis. It is well documented that
the exchange rate is very difficult to predict using any theoretical models for exchange rate
determination. Based on a simple monetary model, we find that the impact of economic
fundamentals on the exchange rate is very similar under both exchange rate regimes according
to OLS estimates, but the difference is statistically significant with GARCH(1,1) results. We
also find that the size of the exchange rate shock is much bigger under the free floating regime
than under the limited flexibility regime. VAR results show that the exchange rate shock impact
on inflation is not statistically different under the two regimes. These findings are generally in
line with Baxter and Stockman (1989) for regime neutrality.
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I. Introduction
After the recent Asian economic crisis of 1997, many Asian countries, including
Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and Korea among others, were forced to devalue
their local currencies and resorted to a free floating exchange rate system. It is
widely believed that fixed or pegged exchange rate regimes are ultimately destined
to collapse, thus resulting in an economic crisis. Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) and
Larrain and Velasco (2001) argue that the solution to economic crises lies in increased
exchange rate flexibility in the long-run.
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Baxter and Stockman (1989) and Flood and Rose (1995) studied the relationship
between exchange rate regimes and macroeconomic volatilities, and found that
macroeconomic volatilities are not particularly dependent on exchange rate regimes.
This paper follows a similar line of research focusing on a single country, Korea.
This paper investigates the macroeconomic structural differences of the Korean
economy under the free floating exchange rate regime after the economic crisis
compared to the limited flexible regime before the economic crisis. The contribution
of this paper is two fold.  First, this paper focuses on Korean exchange rate regimes.
The Korean economy has grown so fast in the last 30 years, that Korea is the 12th
largest economy in the world, joining the OECD in 1996, and becoming one of the
key players in international trade. Even with these achievements, the Korean
economy did not receive due attention in rigorous academic research. Second,
Korean exchange rate regimes provide one of the unique opportunities to study
different behaviors or roles, if any, of a limited flexible regime and a free floating
regime in the same economy. Since the regime change has occurred in a relatively
recent period, it provides a natural experiment to empirically verify the role of
exchange rate regimes on macroeconomic variables.  We will investigate the effect
of exchange rate pass-through on domestic variables such as the inflation rate
under the two different regimes. The results of this paper provide useful guidelines
for emerging economies to properly set their exchange rate system for stable
economic growth.
There is an increasing trend for many developing countries to adopt free floating
exchange rate regimes after economic crises. In reality, however, the officially
declared exchange rate regimes are not what they claim to be. This is the “fear of
floating” by Calvo and Reinhart (2002). The advantages of a fixed regime, especially
for developing countries, are well summarized in Frankel (2003). They are: providing
a nominal anchor to monetary policy, encouraging trade and investment, precluding
competitive depreciation and avoiding speculative bubbles. In short, fixed exchange
regimes provide the stability that developing countries need to maintain their
economic growth. However, as the countries manage to maintain a fixed exchange
rate with occasional interventions, there are usually smaller exchange rate shocks,
but there might be one huge shock that might force the country to abandon the
peg. Under the free floating regime, exchange rates are allowed to move freely to
adjust economics fundamentals, and there may be larger shocks, but there is noECONOMIC FUNDAMENTALS AND EXCHANGE RATES 139
risk of a massive exchange rate shock. Frankel (2003) also provides four advantages
of a free floating exchange rate regime: independent monetary policy, automatic
adjustment to trade shocks, seigniorage and lender of last resort ability, and ability
to avoid speculative attacks.  However, as Frankel points out, it is not completely
clear whether the majority of developing countries can, or are willing to take
advantage of a free floating exchange rate regime.
The next section introduces a simple monetary model of exchange rate
determination based on the purchasing power parity. Section III describes the data
set and presents empirical results. Section IV concludes the paper with some
suggestions on the future direction of the current study.
II. Theoretical framework of exchange rate determination
The theoretical framework of our model is based on the simple monetary model
summarized in Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996). Exchange rate prediction is a notoriously
difficult task, as already demonstrated by Meese and Rogoff (1983). MacDonald
and Taylor (1994), and Mark (1995) use the monetary model to test the predictability
of exchange rates. They claimed the modest success in predicting exchange rates
for a longer horizon. Mark and Sul (2001) use the same model for panel data set of
19 industrialized countries, while Wu and Chen (2001) estimated equation (8) below
using a nonlinear Kalman filter allowing for a time-varying nature of the slope
parameter. The monetary model consists of four behavioral equilibrium equations:
domestic and foreign (ROW) money market equilibrium, the purchasing power
parity condition (PPP) and the uncovered interest parity condition (UIP),
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*
t t y y domestic (foreign) GDP in natural log;
( ):
*
t t i i domestic (foreign) interest rate;
: t s nominal exchange rate (local currency price of one foreign currency) in natural
log;
: 1 + t ts E expectation of  1 + t s at time t;
: 1 0 < < l income elasticity to money demand;
: 0 > f interest semi-elasticity to money demand.
From equations (1) to (3), we have
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* *
t t t t t y y m m f - - - = l are economic fundamentals from domestic and
foreign economies.
By substituting the UIP equation (4) into equation (5), the equilibrium condition
is:
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Under the rational expectations hypothesis with no bubble solutions for the































The exchange rate is expressed as the discounted value of the future economic
fundamentals. This is a characteristic of the monetary model, viewing the exchange
rate as the asset price of the future economic fundamentals. Assume that the
economic fundamentals series {} t f follows a driftless random walk process,  () . 1 I
Then,  () , 1 I ~ t s () . 0 I ~ t s D Since  , 1 1 t t t t v s E s + = + + where  t v is a white noise
forecasting error, nominal exchange rate and fundamentals, {} t t f s ,must be
cointegrated by equation (6).   Rearrange equation (6) to construct an econometric
model of exchange rate changes and fundamentals such that:
(5)
(6)
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, 1 0 1 t t t z s e b b + + = D +
where  ( )
*
t t t t t i i f s z - = - = f is the nominal exchange rate deviations from the
economic fundamentals. We expect  0 1 < b because when  t s is undervalued relative
to the economic fundamentals (() t t f s - increases), nominal exchange rate should
correct downward (appreciation:  t s D decreases) to restore equilibrium.
This is the basic model used to perform exchange rate forecasting based on the
monetary model. This paper extends the exchange rate predictions of the monetary
model to different exchange rate regimes.
III. Evolution of Korean exchange rate controls
The Korean exchange rate system has gone through several fundamental
changes in recent years. From 1974 to 1980, the government strictly regulated
foreign exchange transactions, and the Korean won was pegged to the U.S. dollar.
From February 27, 1980, the Korean won was officially pegged to a basket of
currencies and SDR. The market average exchange rate (MAR) system was first
adopted in March 1990 and maintained a pre-announced crawling peg to U.S.
dollar with bandwidth ± 0.1 to 0.8 % in different periods until October 31, 1994.
Starting November 1, 1994, this band expanded to ± 1.5 %, and December 1, 1995,
this band again expanded to ± 2.25% until an economic crisis hit the country. In
late 1997, the Korean economic crisis broke out and Korea turned to IMF for
rescue. Taking advantage of the opportunities presented by the economic crisis,
Korea has accelerated the speed of economic restructuring including capital
account liberalization and lifting of exchange rate controls.  Korea shifted to a free-
floating exchange rate system on December 17, 1997. The ceiling on foreign
investment in Korean equities was entirely abolished in May 1998, and the local
bond markets and money markets were completely opened to foreign investors. In
June 1998, the Korean government announced a plan to liberalize all foreign
exchange transactions in two stages. The first stage of liberalization took effect on
April 1, 1999 with the introduction of the new Foreign Exchange Transaction
Act. The second stage of liberalization took effect on January 2001. The remaining
ceilings on current account transactions by individuals have been eliminated.
During this period, exchange rate regime classifications have evolved through
several stages. According to the official de jure IMF regime classification, Korea
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maintained a managed float throughout the 1980s and 1990s until the 1997 economic
crisis and moved to a free float after the economic crisis and economic restructuring.
However, there are several other classification schemes that do not agree with the
official de jure classification. Reinhart and Rogoff (2004, RR hereafter) using parallel
rates classify the Korean exchange rate regime as a crawling-peg during 80s and
90s and a free float after 1998. Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003, 2005, LYS
hereafter), using the volatilities of exchange rates and reserves, classify the Korean
exchange rate regime for the crisis period as an intermediate (crawling peg) regime
and the post-crisis period of 1999 and 2000 as a fixed regime. This classification
does not reflect the true nature of Korean exchange rate regimes in recent years.
Dubas, Lee and Mark (2005, DLM hereafter) use volatilities of effective exchange
rates in addition to the official exchange rates and reserves to classify the Korean
exchange rate regime as a limited flexibility regime (similar to crawling peg) with a
few exceptional years for the 1980s and 1990s until the economic crisis, and
independently floating (free float) after 1998.  For the 1980s and 1990s before the
economic crisis, IMF official de jure classification is more flexible than those of RR
and DLM. This paper follows the generally agreed classifications of RR and DLM
for the pre-crisis period as a limited flexibility regime and for the post-crisis period
as a free float.
A. Data description
All our data comes from the IMF International Financial Statistics (IFS) CD-
ROM. Data frequency is monthly except GDP and GDP deflator series, which are
available only on a quarterly basis. We converted the quarterly series into monthly
frequencies by linearly interpolating quarterly observations into monthly
observations.
We used the bilateral nominal exchange rates per U.S. dollars for Australia,
Japan and South Korea for the period of January 1980 to December 2003. These
exchange rates are nominal domestic currency prices per US dollar at the end of
each month. The Japanese yen and Australian dollar are introduced here as
benchmarks for Korean exchange rate regimes. Japan is one of the largest trading
partners of Korea, and Korea has sustained a chronic trade deficit with Japan. In
addition to the close economic relationship between Korean and Japan, the
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Accord. As Calvo and Reinhart (2002) observed, the Japanese yen serves as one
of the reserve currencies of the world. Therefore, its characteristics of free floating
regime may be different from those of small developing economies. In this regard,
Australia is chosen because the Australian dollar is also freely floating, but because
the Australian economy is much smaller than that of Japan, it more closely resembles
typical small developing economies. As in the Calvo and Reinhart (2002) study, we
use the Australian dollar as a benchmark currency for a free floating exchange rate
regime of a small open economy.1
Other economic variables in our analysis are as follows: money supply: M2
measure of nominal money supply; interest rate: short term government bond
rates for Australia and Japan, short term (90 day) deposit rate for Korea, and 3
month U.S. Treasury bill rate; general price level: manufacturing output prices for
Australia, consumer price indices for Japan, Korea and the United States; reserves
are measured as total reserves minus gold in U.S. dollar terms.
We divide our data into three periods according to the regime classifications of
RR and DLM. The first period is from January 1980 to the beginning of the Korean
economic crisis, September 1997 (period 1). During this period, Korean exchange
rates were tightly managed and controlled by the Bank of Korea. Exchange rate
changes are very limited during this period. The second period is the crisis period,
October 1997 to September 1998, when the first round of financial restructuring
was completed following the IMF recommendations to recover from economic
crisis. During the crisis period, nominal exchange rates were unstable and fluctuating
widely. Thus, we exclude this period from our analysis. The last period, starting
October 1998 to the end of sample period, December 2003, is the post crisis free
floating exchange rate regime (period 2). Korean exchange rates were allowed to
move freely during this period with minimal market intervention.2
1 Calvo and Reinhart (2002) use the Australian dollar as a benchmark currency for the floating
exchange rate regimes for small developing countries. Australia, with a credible commitment to
floating, shares many characteristics of small developing countries, and the Australian dollar is
not a world reserve currency. Calvo and Reinhart (2002) report that the probability the
Australian dollar fluctuates within the prescribed 2.5% monthly band for a free floating regime
is about 70% during the monthly period of January 1984 to November 1999. For U.S. dollar/
Deutsche mark, this probability is 59% and it is 61% for Japanese yen/U.S. dollar. The average
of those countries declared as floating regimes in Calvo and Reinhart (2002) is over 79%.
2 The definition of crisis period could be arbitrary. However, varying the crisis window did not
qualitatively alter our results. JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 144
B. Exchange rates and economic fundamentals
First, we will examine the volatilities of two variables that are closely related to
exchange rate regimes, the nominal exchange rate and foreign reserves. We compare
the monthly rate of return volatilities measured as the standard deviation of the
percentage change of the bilateral nominal exchange rates and foreign reserves
), , ( 1 1 - - - = D - = D t t t t t t r r r s s s where st  is the natural log of the nominal
exchange rate St and rt is the natural log of foreign reserves Rt. Table 1 compares the
return volatilities of three exchange rates for two distinct periods, before the Korean
economic crisis for the limited flexibility regime and after the economic crisis for the
free floating regimes.  Volatility is measured as the standard deviation of each
variable.  This table also provides test statistics to test the equality of the volatilities
between two periods.
Table 1. Volatilities for nominal exchange rates and reserves for each period
Limited flexibility regime, period 1 Free floating regime, period 2
January 1980 – September 1997 October 1998 – December 2003
t s D t r D t s D t r D
Korea 0.869 7.505 2.629 1.663
Australia 2.854 9.477 3.204 7.334
Japan 3.387 3.459 3.481 2.442
F-test statistics for  2
2 ,
2
1 , 0 : i i H s s =
Korea t s D 9.162 (0.000) t r D 20.364 (0.000)
Australia t s D 1.260 (0.308) t r D 1.670 (0.011)
Japan t s D 1.056 (0.830) t r D 2.006 (0.001)
Note: Test statistics are for the null hypothesis that volatilities are the same between two periods; p-values
are in parenthesis
Table 1 shows that the Korean won is much less volatile during the limited
flexibility regime, and its volatility is much smaller than that of Australian dollar
and Japanese yen.  During the free float regime, the Korean won is still less volatile
than those other exchange rates, but their difference is now statisticallyECONOMIC FUNDAMENTALS AND EXCHANGE RATES 145
insignificant.3 The Korean won fluctuates as freely as other floating exchange rate
currencies after adopting the free floating regime in period 2. The Australian dollar
and the Japanese yen show little change in volatility during these two periods
even with the recent Asian economic crisis. Test statistics show little evidence of
volatility changes of the two free floating currencies. The Korean won, on the
other hand, shows strong evidence of volatility change during this period. Korean
foreign reserve holdings are much more volatile under the limited flexibility regime
than under the free floating period. This is expected since under limited flexibility
reserves are often used to maintain stable nominal exchange rates (the interest rate
is another policy tool to manage exchange rates). By comparing the reserve
volatilities of two periods, we can observe that the reserve changes have become
increasingly stabilized under the recent free floating exchange regime, especially
for Korea.
Exchange rate volatilities can be best illustrated using the figures. To avoid
cluttering the figures, Figure 1 plots the nominal exchange rate returns for two
currencies, the Korean won (solid line) and the Japanese yen (broken line) against
the U.S. dollar for the entire sample period. Australian dollar returns could also be
plotted in the same figure, but this is not included in Figure 1 to simplify the
presentation.
The Japanese yen is more volatile during period 1 when the Korean won was
under a limited flexibility regime. During period 2 when the Korean won was freely
floating, the two currency volatilities appear to be quite similar, and they are not
statistically different.
Reserves are often used to control and manage nominal exchange rates under
fixed and limited flexibility exchange rate regimes. Figure 2 plots the volatility of
reserve changes for Korea (solid line) and Japan (broken line). It is clear that
Korean reserves were much more volatile than those of Japan during the limited
flexibility regime.  Korean reserves are also more volatile under the limited flexibility
regime than under the free floating regime. This presents the empirical evidence of
exchange rate management schemes. While there are criticisms that Korean
exchange rates are still managed and controlled during the free float period, reserve
3 Levine’s F-test statistic to test the equality of volatilities of three currencies is 1.410 with p-
value of 0.247.  Levine’s test is based on the analysis of variance (ANOVA) of the absolute
mean difference. JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 146
Figure 1.  Monthly percentage changes of the Korean and Japanese nominal exchange rates
per U.S. dollar










Figure 2.  Monthly percentage changes of the reserves for Korea and Japan
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volatility is relatively low. The recent volatility of the Korean nominal exchange
rate exhibits characteristics similar to other free floating exchange rates. In fact,
Korean reserves remain relatively stable and exchange rates are more volatile during
the free floating period. Australia has relatively volatile reserve changes throughout
the period. In fact, even with the free floating exchange rate regime, the probability
reserve changes stay within the 2.5% band is only about 50% according to Calvo
and Reinhart (2002).4 Korean reserve levels were highly volatile during the limited
flexibility regime, but her reserve volatility has decreased significantly under the
free floating regime. Korean reserve volatility is even more stable than Japan’s
during period 2. From Table 1 statistics, we can see that reserve volatilities have
fallen significantly in period 2 compared to period 1 for all three countries. Since
Korea has changed her exchange regime from period 1 to period 2, the reserve
volatility of Korea has been reduced dramatically.
Once we observed the visual pattern of exchange rates movements, we estimate
equation (8) to examine the relationship between exchange rates and economic
fundamentals. Exchange rates, like many other assets prices, often show the
persistence of volatilities in their evolutions. Table 2 is a summary statistic for the
ARCH residuals for the three currencies.
4 Japan has the highest probability of reserve changes within the 2.5% band, 74%, while the
United States has a probability of 62%.
Table 2. Exchange rate behavior (Dst):  ARCH(1) LM test
    Country Korea Australia Japan
     Period All Period 1 Period 2 All All
F-statistic 27.415 6.309 0.789 0.368 0.936
(0.000) (0.013) (0.378) (0.544) (0.334)
Asymptotic  c2 25.088 6.183 0.806 0.371 0.940
(0.000) (0.013) (0.369) (0.543) (0.332)
Note: Null hypothesis is no ARCH residuals. ARCH(1) LM test is performed on the residuals of  exchange
rate changes fitted on the constant. Different lag lengths of ARCH model produce qualitatively similar results.
p-values are in parenthesis.
The Korean won shows ARCH residuals for period 1 and for the entire period,
while there is no evidence of ARCH residuals during free floating period 2. Even JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 148
though the analysis periods exclude the crisis period, there are several episodes of
ARCH residuals (persistent volatilities) under the limited flexibility regime during
the late 1980s and the middle of 1990s leading to the economic crisis. The Australian
dollar and Japanese yen do not show ARCH residuals either for the entire period
or for two periods separately. It is interesting to observe that ARCH residuals
appear only during the limited flexibility exchange rate regime.5
The following two figures, Figures 3 and 4, show that exchange rates are widely
fluctuating around the deviations from economic fundamentals (zt is standardized
to have zero mean) for Korea and Japan, and it is not an easy task to predict
exchange rates using economic fundamentals. The relationship between exchange
rates and fundamentals for Australia show similar patterns to other countries, but
it is not shown here to conserve space. Meese and Rogoff (1983) have shown that
none of the theoretical exchange rate determination models outperform simple
random walk model in the root mean square criteria. Our objective here is not to
predict the exchange rate using the economic fundamentals, but to investigate the
causal relationship between economic fundamentals and the nominal exchange
rate focusing on the exchange rate regime shift of the Korean won, and to compare
it to other flexible exchange rate regimes.
The basic econometric model to examine the relationship between exchange
rates and economic fundamentals is equation (8) from the monetary model
introduced in section II. Table 3 shows the OLS estimation results for three countries,
using
. 1 0 1 t t t z s e b b + + = D +
In Table 3 the Korean won shows ARCH(1) behavior, so in Table 4 we estimated







- - + + = t t t s g e a a s
5 Since the Japanese yen and Australian dollar, two free floating benchmark currencies, do not
show the persistence of volatility during the sample period, the persistence of Korean won
volatility during the limited flexibility regime may be attributed to a sub-optimal (relative to
economic fundamentals) exchange rate policy.
(9)
, 1 1 0 1 + + + + = D t t t z s e b b (10)
(11)ECONOMIC FUNDAMENTALS AND EXCHANGE RATES 149
Figure 3.  Economic fundamentals and the nominal exchange rates for Korea










Figure 4.  Economic fundamentals and the nominal exchange rates for Japan











where  () t t t Var W = +1
2 e s and  t W is an information set at time t.
OLS results show that the Korean won’s fluctuation in response to the
deviations from the economic fundamentals has increase from period 1 to period 2, JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 150
but the difference is not statistically significant. This result is generally in line with
Baxter and Stockman (1989) for the regime neutrality. However, by GARCH(1,1)
estimation, it shows that exchange rate is more sensitive to the economic
fundamentals, and the difference between two periods is statistically  significant
(-1.12 vs. -6.23). Since we have observed the ARCH(1) residuals from Table 2,
GARCH estimation is more efficient than OLS results.  Japan and Australia also
show the increase of slope estimates between two periods, but their differences
are not statistically significant either. While the difference of individual slope
estimates is statistically insignificant, Chow test for the joint hypothesis of
structural stability between two periods strongly rejected for all three countries.
Table 3. OLS estimation
Korea Australia Japan
Period 1 b
0 7.637 (1.810)*** -4.825 (4.051) 20.309 (9.746)**
(210) b1 -1.215 (0.296)*** -0.674 (0.589) -1.844 (0.870)**
SSR 146.772 1706.178 2345.673
Period 2 b0 37.326 (18.735)
** -12.802 (20.301) 55.649 (32.976)
*
(55) b1 -6.215 (3.099)** -1.604 (2.526) -5.404 (3.189)*
SSR 358.863 546.258 640.851
Both periods b
0 8.882(2.911)*** -2.888 (2.272) 8.392 (5.376)
(265) b1 -1.438(0.477)*** -0.387 (0.318) -0.790 (0.487)
SSR 535.406 2258.068 3042.148
F-statistic 7.684 (0.001) 0.326 (0.722) 2.431 (0.090)
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
F-statistic tests the structural equivalence of the two periods,  p-values are in parenthesis.
Table 4. GARCH(1,1) estimation for Korean won





bo -1.125 (0.229)*** -6.226 (2.194)* -0.834 (0.215) ***
ao 0.124 (0.041)*** 0.886 (0.357)** 0.085 (0.026) ***
a
1 0.654 (0.152)*** -0.224 (0.083)*** 0.923 (0.094) ***
g
1 0.341 (0.097)*** 1.082 (0.102)*** 0.400 (0.037)***
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.ECONOMIC FUNDAMENTALS AND EXCHANGE RATES 151
C. Exchange rates and inflation
We are now ready to investigate the impact of exchange rate pass-through to
domestic economic variables. From the purchasing power parity condition (PPP)
of equation (3), there is a one-to-one relationship between the domestic inflation
rate and the nominal exchange rate assuming constant foreign inflation. Therefore,
we would like to see how the change of the nominal exchange rate affects domestic
inflation rate. Our main focus is the effect of exchange rate regimes on the domestic
inflation rate for the Korean economy. An important objective of a fixed exchange
rate regime for a developing economy is to maintain stable price levels to help
increase foreign trade trade. However, aggressive exchange rate defense may
excessively drain foreign reserves, and it may bring further pressure for depreciation
and domestic inflation. The vicious cycle may ultimately result in economic crisis.
We will examine the macroeconomic relationship between inflation and the change
of exchange rates since the 1990s. Figure 5 plots these two variables, inflation
(solid line) and the return of the nominal exchange rate (broken line). Figure 6 is a
scatter gram of these two variables for the two periods. The square symbol
represents the limited flexibility exchange regime (1990:03-1997:09), while the triangle
symbol represents the free floating regime (1998:10-2003:12).
Figure 5. Inflation and the changes of the Korean exchange rate
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Figure 6.  Scattergram of inflation and exchange rate changes
Inflation rate











Exchange rates have become much more volatile while the inflation rate has
become more stable under the free floating regime than under the limited flexibility
regime. For the statistical regression analysis, I will limit my data to two distinctive
periods of the exchange rate regimes, from March 1990 to September 1997 for the
limited flexibility regime and from October 1998 to December 2003 for the free
floating exchange rate.6  Inflation and exchange rates are analyzed using a bivariate
VAR model focusing on the purchasing power parity of equation (3). The additional
exogenous variables are the percentage change of money supply ( t m D ), the real
GDP growth rate ( t rGDP D ), and the Korean import price ( t pr import _ D ) as a
proxy for the foreign prices.7  Exogenous variables are included as one time-
lagged values. The lag length for endogenous variables is two according to the
Schwarz criteria. Other lag length selections were estimated also, but they did not
change the qualitative relationship between these variables. The inflation rate
6 The Korean won was pegged to the U.S. dollar until March 1990.
7 The VAR model is estimated using monthly data.  Since GDP data is available only on a
quarterly frequency, real GDP is interpolated using quarterly nominal GDP and GDP deflators.
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appears to show a strong time trend, but Dickey-Fuller tests with a time trend reject
the unit root hypothesis for all periods. A bivariate VAR model may be too simple
to analyze the complete exchange rate determination model introduced in section
II, but the main objective of this analysis is to focus on the pass-through of the
exchange rate to inflation contrasting two different exchange rate regimes.
Therefore, the estimated bivariate VAR model is:
, 1
2
1 0 t t j j t j j t X Y B B Y e + G + S + = D - - =
where () , , ¢ D = t t t Infl s Y () ¢ D D D = t t t t pr import rGDP m X _ , , and () ¢ = t t t l 2 1 , e e e
are uncorrelated white-noise random shocks. ( ) j j B B G , , 0 are conformable
parameters.
Equation (12) is estimated for the two periods separately, and both periods
combined. The following table presents the estimation results.
Table 5.A shows that the exchange rate is largely unaffected by domestic
inflation, but it is affected by money supply and real GDP growth in period 1. For
period 2, money supply affects inflation significantly, but with the wrong sign.
Table 5.B shows that the one period lagged exchange rate change has a significant
impact on the domestic inflation rate for both periods, but money supply and real
GDP growth do not appear to affect the inflation rate. Import price as a proxy for
the foreign price is statistically significant under the free float regime, while
insignificant under the limited flexibility regime.
The Granger causality test confirms the causal relationship between inflation
and the exchange rate. Table 6 reports Granger causality test statistics with two
lags for each period and the two periods combined. The exchange rate does cause
inflation, but not vice versa.  From the VAR estimates, we can infer that one percent
depreciation of the one period lagged Korean won ( 1 - D t s ) increases the inflation
rate 0.12% for the entire period. This could be a consequence of the small open
economy which is heavily dependent on the intermediate goods imports to promote
exports. Currency depreciation will boost exports, but it also causes worsening
terms of trade, and higher import prices of intermediate goods trigger higher
domestic inflation. It is evident that the export boosting policy during the limited
flexibility exchange rate regime was pursued at the expense of domestic inflation.
However, Table 5.B also shows that the impact of the exchange rate on inflation
(12) JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 154
Table 5. Bivariate VAR model
Period 1 Period 2 Both periods
A. Exchange rate equation
b0 0.343 (0.288) 1.596 (1.104) -0.017 (0.367)
Inflt-1 0.038 (0.148) -1.034 (0.756) -0.001 (0.259)
Inflt-2 -0.067 (0.148) 0.643 (0.619) 0.045 (0.254)
Dst-1 0.144 (0.103) 0.216 (0.144) 0.211 (0.087) **
Dst-2 0.179 (0.105) * -0.104 (0.150) -0.134 (0.088)
Dm
t-1 0.140 (0.056) ** -0.568 (0.298) * -0.045 (0.107)
DrGDPt-1 -0.146 (0.070) ** 0.145 (0.179) -0.004 (0.094)
Dimport_prt-1 -0.022 (0.017) 0.032 (0.046) -0.026 (0.019)
Adjusted R














Inflt-2 - 0.361 (0.101)
***








Dst-2 - 0.100 (0.071) 0.046 (0.033) 0.014 (0.027)
Dm
t-1 - 0.010 (0.038) - 0.090 (0.066) - 0.009 (0.033)
DrGDPt-1 - 0.023 (0.048) - 0.008 (0.040) - 0.021 (0.030)











Note: Standard errors in parenthesis. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%,
respectively. D-F is Dickey-Fuller statistics for the inflation rate. p-value is in parenthesis.
does not appear to be statistically different in the two periods. This result is in line
with Baxter and Stockman (1989) that the exchange rate regime is largely neutral to
macroeconomic variables.
Having established the causal relationship between the exchange rate and
inflation, we would like to see the behavior of these variables in response to the
external shocks. Figure 7 and 8 are impulse response functions (IRF) and
accumulated response functions (ARF) for periods 1 and 2 using the Cholesky
decomposition for two years (24 months).  Since the Cholesky decomposition isECONOMIC FUNDAMENTALS AND EXCHANGE RATES 155
8 The upper-left corner graphs of IRFs from both figures show the size of the exchange rate
shocks.  Observe that two graphs show different scales reflecting the size of shocks for each
period.
Table 6. Granger causality test statistics (F-statistics)
Null hypothesis Period 1 Period 2 Both periods
Dst does not Grange cause Inflt 2.537(0.085) 7.388(0.002) 11.704(0.000)
Inflt  does not Grange cause Dst 0.226(0.799) 0.622(0.541) 0.156(0.856)
Note: Values in parenthesis are p-values for the F-statistic.
sensitive to the order of shocks to the VAR system, we produced two sets response
functions by rotating shock orderings.  However, different shock orderings
produced remarkably similar responses to the point of being virtually identical.
We only report the IRF and ARF of shock ordering of () . , t t Infl s D
Figures 7 and 8 are IRF (upper panel) and ARF (lower panel) for each period.
The lower-left corner of IRF and ARF are responses of inflation to the one standard
deviation shock of the nominal exchange rates. Under the limited flexibility regime
(Figure 7), the impulse responses and accumulated responses are quite mild in
magnitude, and they are statistically insignificant. Under the free-floating regime
(Figure 8), the initial impact on inflation from the exchange rate shock is relatively
large and statistically significant from two to five months. This shows that under
the managed exchange rate regime, the exchange rate shock does not directly
transmit to other macroeconomic variables, especially the inflation rate. Under the
floating exchange rate regime, the nominal exchange rate depreciation directly
passes through to the domestic price level. However, this difference is largely due
to the different size of the shocks in the two periods.8  Exchange rate shocks are
much bigger under the free float regime than under limited flexibility. Under the
limited flexibility regime, exchange rate policy effectively limited the size of the
exchange rate shocks, and minimized the impact on domestic inflation. The
accumulated impulses remain positive and statistically significant in the long-term
under the free float regime.
The upper-right corner of IRF and ARF are the responses of the exchange rate
to the shocks of inflation. As we demonstrated previously with VAR results and JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 156
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Granger causality tests, the impact of inflation shock on the exchange rates are
statistically insignificant for both periods.
IV. Conclusion
This paper investigated the role of economic fundamentals in the determination
of the exchange rate under different exchange rate regimes. Focusing on the Korean
economy, this paper found that the impact of economic fundamentals on exchange
rates has increased under the free float regime. However, the difference between
the two periods is statistically significant only according to the GARCH(1,1)
estimation, not to the OLS estimation. VAR estimation results show that the impact
of exchange rates on domestic inflation is remarkably similar under the two different
regimes. The major difference is that the size of exchange rate shocks has become
much bigger under the free float regime. IRF and ARF show the lasting impact of
the exchange rate shock on a domestic variable, the inflation rate. In short, under
the free floating regime, exchange rates are allowed to move freely, thus reflecting
the underlying economic fundamentals more accurately.
It is true that the exchange rate has become more volatile under the flexible
exchange rate system than under the limited flexibility regime. To reduce short-run
volatility of the flexible exchange rate system, the Korean government needs to
pursue an exchange rate policy to reduce the short-run volatility of the flexible
exchange rate system and promote stable economic growth.
It is still an open question regarding which exchange rate regime is better for
economic growth in the long-run, especially for developing economies. My future
research will expand the current topic to investigate the relationship between
different exchange rate regimes and other macro economic performances, especially
economic growth.
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